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Abstract
This paper studies the performance of four market protocols with regard to allocative
efficiency and other performance criteria such as volume or volatility. We examine batch
auctions, continuous double auctions, specialist dealerships, and a hybrid of these last two. All
protocols are practically implementable because the messages that traders need to use are
simple. We test the protocols by running (computerized) experiments in an environment that
controls for traders’ behavior and rules out any informational effect. We find that all protocols
generically converge to the efficient allocation in finite time. An extended comparison over
other performance criteria produces no clear winner, but the presence of a specialist is
associated with the best all-round performance.
r 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
JEL classification: G19; D61; D44; C63
Keywords: Market microstructure; Allocative efficiency; Comparison of market institutions; Performance
criteria
1. Introduction
Financial markets where agents exchange risky assets serve two main purposes.
First, they allocate risk among traders and improve allocative efficiency. Second,
they diffuse traders’ private information and facilitate information diffusion.
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The simultaneous pursuit of allocative and informational efficiency is usually
impossible. Different market arrangements are more favorable to the search for
different notions of efficiency. We observe that the state of knowledge in this respect
is remarkably unbalanced.
There is a vast literature on market microstructure that is especially keen on the
analysis of the conditions affecting the revelation (and exploitation) of private
information. On the other hand, much less attention has been devoted to the
functioning of financial markets with respect to allocative efficiency. This problem is
the focus of our paper, which aims to provide the experimental evidence needed to
ground a theoretical analysis.
We study the performance of four market protocols with regard to allocative
efficiency and other performance criteria such as volume or volatility. These
additional criteria are usually extolled by exchange regulators because they can be
objectively measured and provide useful proxies for the evaluation of a market
protocol. The four market protocols that we examine are: the batch auction, the
continuous double auction, a special form of (nondiscretionary) specialist dealership,
and a hybrid of these last two. Contrary to theoretical constructs such as Walrasian
taˆtonnement, these four protocols are practically implementable because the
messages that traders need to use are simple.
We test the protocols by running (computerized) experiments in an environment
that controls for traders’ behavior and rules out any informational effect.
The behavior of the agents span how they formulate trading strategies, how they
form expectations, and how they interpret signals. Working with agent-based
simulations instead of human agents permits to isolate the impact of the trading
protocols from these behavioral components. In standard laboratory experiments,
instead, it is not possible to extricate the interactions between protocol and
behavioral effects.
The main behavioral limitation on our agents is that they exhibit limited
intelligence, similar to the ‘zero intelligence’ traders in Gode and Sunder (1993). The
price of the risky asset is the main driver for their choices; but, like real traders in real
markets, they ignore the correct equilibrium price and thus lack an essential piece of
information to compute the efficient allocation. This leaves the market protocol in
charge of ‘discovering’ the right price for them. From a roaring and confused crowd
of traders each trying to (guess and) achieve his preferred risk allocation, the market
protocol must extract and send out price signals that point traders in the right
direction. This makes convergence to the ‘right’ price a necessary condition for
allocative efficiency. Assuming that there is sufficient liquidity in the market, we find
that all protocols generically converge to the efficient allocation and to the
equilibrium price in finite time. It is worth noting that our protocols share several
characteristics with the general stochastic decentralized resource allocation process
developed in Hurwicz et al. (1975), which gives a formal proof for its convergence in
finite time.
We then turn to a dynamic analysis of the performances. For practical purposes, it
is probably more important to know how protocols perform during the (perhaps
long) transient period before they achieve the efficient allocation. We study how long
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it takes for different protocols to discover the equilibrium price and how fast they
lead traders to the efficient risk-sharing allocation. We measure the volume of trade
developed to reach the efficient allocation from the initial endowment as well as the
volatility of the time series of prices. This extended comparison over several dynamic
performance criteria produces no clear winner, but the presence of a nondiscre-
tionary specialist dealer is associated with the best all-round performance.
Continuing the analogy above, the introduction of an nondiscretionary ‘center’ in
a market protocol seems to improve its ability to stabilize and direct traders’ own
groping for the right price.
The organization of the paper as follows. Section 2 describes the model tested in
our experiments. In particular, Section 2.5 provides a comparative review of our
model against the relevant literature. Section 3 details the experimental design and
provides detailed instructions for its replication. Section 4 reports on the results
obtained and Section 5 offers our conclusions.
2. The model
Following Smith (1982), we identify three distinct components for our (simulated)
exchange markets. The environment in Section 2.1 describes the general
characteristics of the economy, including agents’ preferences and endowments.
The market protocols in Section 2.2 provide the institutional details which regulate
the functioning of an exchange. The behavioral assumptions in Section 2.3 specify
how agents make decisions and take actions. Section 2.4 details a few alternative
behavioral assumptions that have been used to test the robustness of our
conclusions. Finally, Section 2.5 compares how our assumptions fare with those
prevailing in the literature.
2.1. The environment
We consider a two-asset economy with n traders. The two available assets are a
risky stock and cash. The rate of interest is normalized to zero, so cash acts as the
nume´raire. The stock pays no dividends and has a (random) realization value Y at a
given time T in the far future. Each trader i has an initial endowment of cash ciX0
and shares siX0. The total amount of cash and stock in the economy is C ¼
P
ici40
and S ¼Pisi40.
To rule out any informational effect, we assume that all traders believe that Y is
normally distributed with mean mX0 and precision t ¼ 1=s240 and that no new
information is ever released. Therefore, traders’ beliefs about Y are homogeneous
and never change until uncertainty resolves.
Each trader i has CARA preferences over his final wealth, with a coefficient of risk
tolerance ki40. Therefore, trader i’s excess demand function for stock (net of his
endowment si) is the linear function
qiðpÞ ¼ kitðm pÞ  si. (1)
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Let K ¼Piki be the sum of traders’ coefficients of risk tolerance. By well-known
results pioneered in Wilson (1968), the unique efficient risk-sharing allocation for
this economy requires that trader i holds si ¼ ðS=KÞki shares of the stock. In other
words, the efficient allocation is unique and proportional to the coefficients of risk
tolerance.
2.2. The market protocols
Clearly, the competitive equilibrium achieves the efficient allocation in this
environment. The zero aggregate excess demand condition implies
p ¼ m S
tK
. (2)
At price p, the trader i’s net demand
qiðpÞ ¼
S
K
 
ki  si
is exactly filled, making his final allocation qiðpÞ þ si equal to the required
si ¼ ðS=KÞki. Hence, if a market protocol attains the competitive equilibrium, it
implements the efficient allocation.
The issue, however, is that the informational requirements for a competitive
equilibrium are often not realistic. For instance, the fictitious protocol of the
Walrasian auctioneer requires an iterative process during which traders commu-
nicate their entire excess demand function to a centralized market maker before any
trade actually takes place. Realistic market protocols are much simpler, in the sense
that they require far less information from traders.
We compare the performances of four simple market protocols: a batch auction, a
continuous double auction, an automated dealership, and a hybrid market. The first
protocol is simultaneous, while the other three are sequential. Except where
otherwise noted, the following features are common to all the four protocols.
A protocol is organized in trading sessions (or days). Agents participate in every
trading session, but each of them can exchange at most one unit in each trading day.
During a trading session, an agent can buy or sell at most one unit of the risky asset.
If the protocol is sequential, the order in which agents place their orders is randomly
chosen for each trading session. If the protocol is simultaneous, all orders are made
known and processed simultaneously so the time of their submission is irrelevant. In
every trading session, each agent selects randomly one side of the market where he
attempts to place a trade: he can switch roles across trading sessions, but he cannot
place simultaneous orders for buying and selling within the same session. The books
are completely cleared at the end of each trading session.
Prices are quoted using a minimum tick; in other words, they are discretized
throughout the paper. Moreover, prices must be nonnegative: if a trader places a bid
lower than zero, this is ignored; if a trader places an ask lower than zero, this is
automatically converted to the lowest strictly positive price compatible with the
existing tick.
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Batch auction: In each trading session, after traders submit their orders, the
aggregate excess demand function is computed and the exchange price p is
determined by setting the aggregate excess demand equal to zero. If there are
multiple solutions, we select the midpoint of the interval between the lowest and the
highest clearing price. (If there are no solutions, no exchange takes place.) Shares
and corresponding payments are exchanged between traders who submitted bids no
lower than p and asks no higher than p. Traders who placed orders exactly at price p
may be accordingly rationed. This protocol is also known as the k-double auction,
with k ¼ 1
2
.
Continuous double auction: In each trading session, traders place their orders on
the selling and buying books. Their orders are immediately executed if they are
marketable; otherwise, they are recorded on the books with the usual price–time
priority. Orders are canceled only when a matching order arrives or the trading day
is over.
Automated dealership: There is a specialist dealer who posts bids and asks valid
only for a unit transaction. Agents check sequentially the dealer’s quotes for the side
of the transaction they are attempting. If an agent accepts the dealer’s quote, the
exchange takes place at the quoted price. Right after a transaction is completed, the
two dealer’s quotes for bid and ask increase by one tick if the agent completed a
purchase and decrease by one tick otherwise. The size of the bid–ask spread stays
fixed over time, so the price is never unique. Limited to this protocol, therefore,
convergence of prices to a given value p should be interpreted as convergence of
prices to a bid–ask interval that contains p. Throughout the paper, we maintain a
feminine gender for the dealer and keep her distinct from the traders who are
assumed to be male.
Hybrid market: This protocol combines the continuous double auction with the
automated dealership. Distinct selling and buying books hold quotes from the
specialist dealer and from the public, respectively. The dealer must post bids and
asks valid only for a unit transaction and revises her quotes as in the automated
dealership; in particular, she moves her quotes only after transactions in which she
has been involved. Agents check sequentially the books for the side of the
transaction they are attempting. Their orders are immediately executed at the best
price available (which may be different from the specialist’s) if they are marketable;
otherwise, they are recorded on the traders’ book with the usual price–time priority.
Agents’ orders are canceled only when a matching order arrives or the trading day is
over. Hence, once deposited on the traders’ book, an order from an agent cannot be
executed with the dealer.
We note two limitations to the realism of our assumptions about the
market protocols. First, in a sequential protocol, the order of arrival for
agents is randomly chosen: this mutes any issue concerning the trade-off between
efficacy and immediacy. Second, we assume that agents can trade at most
one unit per trading session: this circumvents the problem of choosing the
order size. Similar restrictive assumptions are common in the literature; see, for
instance, Glosten and Milgrom (1985), which has inspired our version of specialist
dealership.
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2.3. Behavioral assumptions
A major obstacle in the study of microeconomic systems is that their performance
is jointly determined by the interactions of traders’ behavior within the market
protocol. As traders may react differently to different market protocols, it is difficult
to separate the intrinsic characteristics of a market protocol from the properties
induced by the traders’ strategies. Our approach concentrates on the institutional
characteristics of the protocols, by making general-purpose assumptions on traders’
behavior that constrain their freedom of choice. Except where otherwise noted, these
assumptions hold for all the (computerized) experiments reported in this paper.
There are three established assumptions in the literature. One is that traders are
restricted to trade one unit at a time. This restriction on traded quantities simplifies
the strategy space and allows direct comparisons with existing theoretical results.
The second assumption states that buying orders are constrained by the available
cash and selling orders by the available endowment of stock; that is, budget
constraints hold. This is consistent with a value-based strategy (‘buy low, sell high’),
which is a seemingly natural requirement of rationality for traders’ behaviors. The
third assumption is that each trader has a constant valuation for each unit traded.
We maintain the first two assumptions, but relax the third one.
In our setting, the demand function (1) of each trader is strictly decreasing. The
assumption of constant unit valuations is naturally generalized by deducing the
valuation for the next units to trade from the demand function. If the current
endowment of a trader is si, we invert his excess demand function qi ¼ kitðm pÞ  si
and derive his valuation for the next n units to trade as
viðn; si; kiÞ ¼ m si  n
kit
, (3)
where the  sign denotes whether the attempted trade is a purchase or a sale.
Clearly, this implies that the reservation price of each trader depends on the side of
the transaction he is entering, on his current endowment si, and on the coefficient of
risk aversion ki; for simplicity, we suppress these last two arguments and just write
viðnÞ. Note that, when a trader is restricted to a unit trade, his (implicit) bid–ask
spread is simply við1Þ  viðþ1Þ ¼ 2=ðkitÞ.
Given his valuation, a trader must decide which side of the transaction he wants to
attempt and (if necessary) what price to offer. We assume that, at the start of a
trading session, each trader chooses either side with equal probability. This
randomized choice is stochastically independent of previous history, endowment, or
any other variable of the model. After the choice of the trading side is made,
therefore, a trader ‘knows’ that he is going to be a buyer (or a seller) and that his
valuation for the next unit he will attempt to buy (or sell) is viðþ1Þ (or við1Þ) from
Eq. (3). Once his trading intentions are known, a trader (deterministically) places a
bid or an ask equal to his valuation. An agent posting a price equal to his valuation
may still trade at a lower price, but he is ‘truthfully’ revealing his willingness to buy
or sell one more unit. Therefore, we nickname this assumption by TT as a mnemonic
for ‘truth-telling’ behavior.
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The common properties of our market protocols may impose two deviations from
TT. First, the valuation of a trader may be a number different from the ticked prices.
As detailed below, we adopt an ‘exact’ experimental design that rules out this case.
Second, the valuation of a trader may be negative; in this occurrence, all protocols
refuse negative bids and automatically update a negative ask to the lowest nonzero
ticked price.
2.4. Alternative behavioral assumptions
The set of assumptions in Section 2.3 uniquely determines traders’ behavior in
each of the four market protocols examined in this paper. In our simplified
environment, therefore, the differences in performances are due only to the
institutional differences embodied in the market protocols. This insulation from
spurious effects (due to traders’ behavior) makes it possible to evaluate market
protocols on their own. Clearly, this insulation carries a cost in realism because it is a
sensible assumption that real traders adjust their strategies to the type of market
protocol they are forced to use. Rather, the agents in our simulations exhibit zero
intelligence under several respects. (See LiCalzi and Pellizzari, 2006 for a study of the
impact of introducing minimal forms of intelligence.) They do not react to
differences in the market protocol; they do not attempt to trade strategically; they do
not update their behavior rules over time.
Given that the purpose of the study is to understand the performance of market
protocols per se, we justify the assumption of zero intelligence because the
experimental design should try as much as possible to keep traders’ behavior
unchanged across different institutions. On the other hand, since there are several
ways to achieve this objective, we have tested the robustness of our conclusions
under two alternative scenarios. Their generation is inspired by the observation that
trading strategies solve a trade-off between efficacy and immediacy. Higher asks and
lower bids make trading less aggressive. This increases efficacy (conditional on
trading taking place) but lowers immediacy. Taking TT as the reference point, we
examine how market protocols perform under two alternative set of assumptions
that are less and more aggressive, respectively. We nickname them TT and TTþ
with obvious reference to how aggressive are the trading strategies they generate
compared to TT. Since traders are restricted to unit trades, we leave it understood
for the rest of this section that prices refer to unit trades.
The first set of assumptions is directly inspired by Gode and Sunder (1993). Under
the heading of ‘zero intelligence’, they assume that a buyer i bids a price uniformly
drawn from the interval ½0; viðþ1Þ and a seller i asks a price uniformly drawn from
the interval ½við1Þ;M, where M is an exogenously given upper bound on the
feasible prices. Gode and Sunder (1993) assume constant valuations, so it seems
natural that M be fixed. In our environment, where agent i’s valuations við1Þ ¼
m ðsi  1Þ=ðkitÞ are decreasing in the current stock endowment si, we prefer to
endogenize the choice of intervals from which a trader picks his bid and ask prices.
We assume that a potential buyer i with a current stock endowment si bids a
price that is uniformly drawn from the ticked prices in the interval ðviðþ2Þ; viðþ1Þ.
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The upper bound of the interval is the same of Gode and Sunder (1993) and implies
that an agent never bids a price (valid for one unit) above his valuation for one unit.
The lower bound of the interval implies that an agent never bids a price (valid for
one unit) so low that he would rather buy two units. Symmetrically, a potential
seller i asks a price that is uniformly drawn from the ticked prices in the
interval ½við1Þ; við2ÞÞ. It is worth noting that when these assumptions generate
negative prices, they are ignored or updated by the market protocols as described in
Section 2.2.
Compared to TT, where each trader i always bids viðþ1Þ or asks við1Þ, this set of
assumptions implies that with positive probability bids are lower and asks are higher,
so trading under this set of assumptions (nicknamed TT) is less aggressive. This
can be viewed as an approximation for that common form of strategic trading that
misrepresents valuations in order to extract more surplus from a transaction. As this
makes it harder to complete a transaction, it reduces immediacy; on the other hand,
conditional on trading taking place, it increases the probability of a better price and
thus improves efficacy.
The second alternative set of behavioral assumptions generates more aggressive
trading than TT and is thus nicknamed TTþ. It is inspired by a formal symmetry
with the less aggressive TT, as shown in Fig. 1. Under TT, a trader i with current
endowment si bids viðþ1Þ or asks við1Þ. Under TT, bid and ask generation is
shifted outward to the intervals ðviðþ2Þ; viðþ1Þ and ½við1Þ; við2ÞÞ. Under TTþ, bid
and ask generation is shifted inward and prices are taken from within the intervals
½viðþ1Þ; við0ÞÞ and ðvið0Þ; við1Þ. However, modeling this behavior in an economically
plausible way requires some care.
Consider a trader i who has a valuation viðþ1Þ for one additional unit. If he buys it
at price of p, this exchange generates a trading surplus of viðþ1Þ  p for him.
Similarly, the trading surplus for a seller is p við1Þ. Let giðtÞ be the trading
surplus realized by trader i at time t. (If he completes no trade, let giðtÞ ¼ 0.) Under
TT (or TT) we have giðtÞX0 for all t; that is, no trade generates a negative surplus.
ARTICLE IN PRESS
BID
TT
TT-
ASK
TT+
v(+2) v(+1) v(0) v(-1) v(-2)
Fig. 1. Intervals for bid and ask generation.
M. LiCalzi, P. Pellizzari / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 31 (2007) 3568–3590 3575
Author's personal copy
This is consistent with an individual rationality constraint under which each unit
trade must be profitable. In our environment, however, a trader is likely to undergo
several rounds of trading before the efficient allocation is attained so that his
cumulative trading surplus is also of interest.
Define the cumulative trading surplus realized by trader i at time t as the
(undiscounted) sum GiðtÞ ¼
Pt
t¼1giðtÞ of his past trading surpluses up to time t. If
the agent attempts to speed up his trading by using more aggressive pricing than
under TT, he may use his cumulative surplus Giðt 1Þ from the past trades (up to
but not including t) to cover a potential loss in the current unit trade. This turns the
individual rationality constraint into the weaker requirement that GiðtÞX0 for all t,
leaving the sign of giðtÞ unrestricted. That is, even if the agent may occasionally trade
at unfavorable terms, his overall trading surplus with respect to the initial position
remains positive.
Formally, under TTþ we assume the following. In each trading session t, a
potential buyer i with a current stock endowment si and a cumulative trading surplus
Giðt 1Þ bids a price that is uniformly drawn from the ticked prices in the interval
½viðþ1Þ; aÞ, where a is the minimum between við0Þ and viðþ1Þ þ Giðt 1Þ.
Symmetrically, a potential seller i asks a price that is uniformly drawn from the
ticked prices in the interval ðb; við1Þ, where b is the maximum between við0Þ and
við1Þ  Giðt 1Þ. Consider the interval ½viðþ1Þ; aÞ enclosing the possible bid prices.
The lower bound is the same price bid under TT so that bids are more aggressive.
The upper bound requires the highest possible bid to be smaller than both við0Þ and
viðþ1Þ þ Giðt 1Þ: the first inequality makes sure that the bid and the ask associated
with i never cross; and the second inequality implies that even in the worst case
(when trade occurs at a price of viðþ1Þ þ Giðt 1Þ) the cumulative trading surplus
for i does not go negative.
2.5. Comparison with the literature
The seminal contribution about computerized experiments in a controlled
environment is Gode and Sunder (1993). This paper establishes the allocative
efficiency of the continuous double auction under zero intelligence or, in our jargon,
under an assumption similar to TT. Our analysis extends this work into two
directions. First, we explicitly compare the allocative efficiency of several different
market protocols and find that they all share the ability to lead zero intelligence
traders towards the efficient allocation. Second, we replace their assumption of
constant unit valuations for each trader with decreasing unit valuations. In
particular, this would dispose of the critique in Cliff and Bruten (1997) about
possible nonconvergence to the equilibrium price.
Bottazzi et al. (2005) compare the allocative efficiency and other performance
criteria for three protocols (Walrasian taˆtonnement, the batch auction, and the
continuous double auction) in an environment different from ours. They consider an
ecology of trend followers and noise traders. The trend followers update their
expectations about the future price of the equity and all traders can place both
market and limit orders for different quantities. Their study is unable to separate
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behavioral from market effects, leading to the prudent conclusion reported in the
abstract: ‘The results highlight the importance of the institutional setting in shaping
the dynamics of the market but also suggest that the latter can become the outcome
of a complicated interaction between the trading protocol and the ecology of traders’
behaviors. In particular, we show that market architectures bear a central influence
upon the time series properties of market dynamics. Conversely, the revealed
allocative efficiency of different market settings is strongly influenced by the trading
behavior of agents.’ At the end of Section 4.3 we compare our results with theirs,
showing that they share a few qualitative features.
Audet et al. (2002) compare execution quality in a batch auction and in a
competitive (and discretionary) dealership market. The paper argues that execution
quality is a multidimensional concept, whose appraisal involves some combination
of different measures of performance. From a behavioral point of view, the paper
assumes liquidity traders subject to informational shocks and derives choices using a
complex neural network approximation to Nash behavior. The main conclusion is
that (their own variant of) the competitive dealership provides superior execution
quality when trading is thin and correlated or when there are large liquidity shocks.
Satterthwaite and Williams (2002) view a market protocol as an algorithm to solve
the problem of allocative efficiency. A finite number of agents are privately informed
about their valuations. After being exogenously assigned the role of buyers or sellers,
these agents are restricted to trade at most one unit in a single trading session. Traders
view the market as a one-shot game with incomplete information and play equilibrium
strategies. Under these assumptions, allocative efficiency is not attained. However, the
paper proves that the batch auction is worst-case asymptotically optimal: as the
number of agents grows, it forces the worst-case inefficiency to zero at the fastest
possible rate. Transient effects or other measure of performance is not considered.
3. Experimental design
3.1. Identification
A simulation run for our model requires the specification of five global
parameters, a list of individual variables for each trader, as well as specific
assumptions about market protocol and traders’ behavior. The global parameters
are the number n of traders, the mean m and the variance s2 of the realization value Y
of the stock, the number t of trading sessions, and the size D of the tick. Individually,
a trader i is characterized by his coefficient ki of risk tolerance, by his endowment of
cash ci, and stock si. Finally, for protocols involving the (female) dealer, we need to
select her initial quotes.
The market protocols are described in Section 2.2. For ease of reference,
we nickname these four protocols as B (batch auction), C (continuous double
auction), D (dealership), and H (hybrid market). Similarly, our three sets of
behavioral assumptions are described in Sections 2.3 and 2.4. They have been
nicknamed TT (truth-telling), TT (less aggressive than TT), and TTþ (more
aggressive).
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We have run (computerized) simulations for all 4 3 ¼ 12 possible combinations
of protocols and behavioral assumptions over different instantiations of the
parameters. The results reported in Section 4 seem to be robust to substantial
changes in the parameters. The only exception that needs a separate study (left to
future research) is the case where the overall liquidity C ¼Pici of the system is very
low. Therefore, to simplify the presentation, we fix the exemplar parametric
configuration reported in Table 1 and report the simulations for the four market
protocols under different behavioral assumptions. The initial dealer’s quotes are a
bid of 745 and an ask of 751 with a fixed bid–ask spread of 6.
The coefficients of risk aversion ki and the initial endowments si for each trader
are obtained as follows. Initially, we generate a vector a of n ¼ 1; 000 stochastically
independent draws from the uniform distribution over the integers f10; 12; 15; 20;
24; 30; 40g. Then, keeping a fixed, we initialize the ki’s and the si’s for a round
of simulation by ki ¼ apðiÞ and si ¼ 2  ap0ðiÞ, where p and p0 are stochastically
independent random permutations of the vector a. This approach has two main
advantages.
The first advantage concerns the prices posted by traders. Because the tick is
D ¼ 1, the ticked prices for our exemplar configuration are integers. Recall that
buying and selling valuations for n units obey (3). If the right-hand side of (3) is
always an integer, under any of our behavioral assumptions traders post bid and ask
prices that are integers; and therefore the market protocol need not round them to a
ticked price. In the exemplar, we choose integer values for m and s2 and initialize
each ki with a divisor of s2. (The choice s2 ¼ 120 makes sure that there is adequate
variety among the divisors.) Then, for all the simulations we report in this paper, the
prices submitted by the agents are never rounded by the market protocol.
The second related advantage affects the competitive equilibrium price given by
(2). If the right-hand side of (2) is an integer, the competitive equilibrium price is
among the ticked prices that the market protocol can actually generate; and thus it is
possible to have exact convergence to the equilibrium price supporting the efficient
allocation. (Properly speaking, exact convergence is not relevant under the
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Table 1
Exemplar for identification
Parameters Initialization
Global
n ¼ 1,000
m ¼ 1,000
s2 ¼ 120
t ¼ 1,500
D ¼ 1
Trader
ki 2 f10; 12; 15; 20; 24; 30; 40g
ci ¼ 50,000
si 2 f20; 24; 30; 40; 48; 60; 80g
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dealership protocol, because the fixed bid–ask spread prevents the price from being
unique.) In the exemplar, the vector of si’s is a random permutation of the vector of
2ki’s. This implies that S ¼
P
isi ¼ 2
P
iki ¼ 2K . Therefore, by (2), the competitive
equilibrium price is p ¼ m 2s2 ¼ 760 for those protocols (B and C) where the
dealer is absent.1
Finally, we stress that the parameters in the exemplar are not an attempt to
calibrate the model to any specific set of real data. We do not claim that our model
has the descriptive power that would warrant a calibration exercise. Our simulations
are blind to any informational effects and thus are not fit to replicate the price
dynamics observed in real markets. The purpose of this study is limited to gather
evidence on the performance of different market protocols with regard to allocative
efficiency, and our results do not extrapolate to markets subject to informational
effects.
3.2. The simulations
A round of testing requires to simulate 4 3 ¼ 12 possible combinations
of protocols and behavioral assumptions. In order to keep experimental conditions
as comparable as possible, a typical round of simulations run as follows. For
each batch of 12 combinations, we instantiate parameters according to the
exemplar. We reiterate that, although we have tested a large range of exemplars,
for simplicity all simulations reported in this paper share the initialization reported
in Table 1.
We also try to reduce to a minimum the impact of randomness on the simulations.
Under TT, the only sources of randomness are in the order in which agents are
sampled under a sequential market protocol and in the choice of which side of the
transaction they attempt to complete. Under TT, a third source of randomness is
in the selection of bids and asks from two intervals of possible choices. For each
batch of simulations, we use the same (randomly chosen) sampling and the same
(randomly chosen) selection of transacting sides. In other words, the sequence in
which players place orders and the side they attempt to transact is the same within
each batch of 12 simulations.
At the end of a batch of simulations, we record the time series for prices, volume,
and endowments, and compute relevant statistics for the performance criteria
discussed in the next section. The simulations have been run using a dedicated
package of routines written in Pascal.
3.3. The performance criteria
There are several criteria that can be used to evaluate the performance of a market
protocol. Our first focus of interest is the ability of market protocols to attain the
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efficient allocation, so we report on their convergence to the efficient allocation as
well as on the speed with which they achieve it. We measure traded volume, because
higher volumes signal less effective protocols that let unnecessary trades take place.
The second focus of interest is the dynamic behavior of a protocol (‘how does it get
there?’) and therefore we also keep track of cumulative volumes and other
appropriate indicators over time. For instance, we report standard deviations and
kurtosis for the time series of the closing prices. These are useful indicators for
assessing the stability of prices over time, even though Stigler (1964) has long ago
warned that one cannot take for granted that ‘smoothness of price movements is the
sign of an efficient market’ (p. 125). A detailed description of the performance
criteria used follows hereafter.
The first basic criterion of allocative efficiency is whether a protocol converges to
the efficient allocation in finite time. Convergence to the efficient allocation is
generically achieved, at a price equal to the competitive equilibrium price p. Clearly,
in any of the four protocols the current price may hit p before the efficient allocation
is attained. Therefore, we evaluate the speed of convergence by recording the number
of trading sessions completed before no further trading takes place. For short, we
call this number NT as a mnemonic for ‘no trade’. To evaluate the dynamic
properties of the protocols, we also keep track over time of the distance of the
current allocation from the efficient one.
Volume is measured by the total number of one-unit transactions completed
before attaining convergence to the efficient allocation. We also monitor volume
over time, measured by the cumulative number of transactions completed within the
first t trading sessions. Under the dealership protocol, the transfer of one unit from a
trader to another one must go through the dealer and therefore requires two
transactions instead of just one. Whenever two matching transactions go through the
dealer, we record them as one so that the statistics for volume report for each
protocol the effective number of transactions completed between agents. This makes
volume directly comparable across protocols, even if it fails to record the few units of
unmatched inventory that may remain with the specialist.
Another evaluation criterion is the subjective welfare of the traders, which we
measure by the certainty equivalent of their current position. The advantage of using
certainty equivalents over utilities is that we can compute (and compare) the
monetary value of an allocation by summing up the certainty equivalents of all
traders. We note that protocols such as the batch auction or the continuous double
auction are self-contained, in the sense that traders exchange cash and stock only
among themselves. The overall value of an efficient allocation is of course always the
same. However, when a round-trip trade goes through a dealer, some money is lost
because of the bid–ask spread. Therefore, we expect the overall value of the
allocation to be lower for protocols which are not self-contained.
Finally, we keep track of the standard deviations and the kurtosis of the time
series of closing prices. (The closing price is the last price at which a transaction has
taken place by the end of the current trading session.) For each simulation,
we compute these two statistics over the closing prices between the first trading
session and the last active trading session; that is, from time t ¼ 1 to NT. As usual,
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we report the standardized kurtosis k ¼ m4=m22  3, where mi is the ith central
moment of the empirical distribution. It is well known that k ¼ 0 for a normal
distribution. From a dynamic point of view, we report the standard deviations over
closing prices computed over a moving time window formed by the last 20 trading
sessions.
4. Results
For each of the four market protocols, we have run 100 simulations under the
different three behavioral assumptions. To simplify the presentation, we fix the
choice of parameters as described above in Table 1 and separately study the
variations across the four protocols for each of our three behavioral assumptions.
Section 4.1 reports our results under the TT assumption. Section 4.2 provides a
similar description under both TT and TTþ. Neither of these two alternative
behavioral assumptions entails major qualitative changes in the results, suggesting
that these are mainly imputable to differences in the market protocols. A separate
robustness analysis in Section 4.3 discusses the choice of parameters different from
our exemplar.
From a static point of view, the obvious benchmark for the comparative
evaluation of our performance criteria is the Walrasian allocation mechanism known
as taˆtonnement. While its informational requirements are unwieldy and thus its
practical interest is very limited, in our context the taˆtonnement protocol is
guaranteed to yield the efficient allocation in one (giant) step. This protocol also
attains the competitive equilibrium price p. Finally, and perhaps more interestingly,
it minimizes the number of transactions needed to achieve the efficient allocation
because it correctly matches traders with positive excess demand with agents with
negative excess demand.
4.1. The TT assumption
Table 2 reports summary statistics computed as averages over 100 different
batches of simulations under the TT behavioral assumption. We have checked these
averages against the medians for the same data and there are no substantial
differences so that spurious outlier effects are ruled out. Even a qualitative inspection
of the data from a sample of individual simulations shows no significant departures
from the averages. The table reports several pieces of information for each of the
four protocols, as listed in the first column. We comment on each of them.
The second and third columns give the traded volume (Vol) and the percentage of
excess volume (ExcV) with respect to the number of transactions that the Walrasian
protocol would require to achieve in one step the efficient allocation. The batch
auction and the specialist dealership generate minimal excess volume: which one
performs better in this respect depends on how far are the initial dealer’s quotes from
the equilibrium price. The continuous double auction is seriously wasteful, while the
hybrid protocol sits in between its parents (dealership and continuous double
auction). The ranking with respect to volume is fVolB;VolDgoVolHoVolC, where
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the notation fVolB;VolDg means that the ranking is not conclusive. From a dynamic
point of view, Fig. 2 confirms this ranking. In particular, note how similar statistics
for B and D in Table 2 correspond to overlapping curves in Fig. 2.
The fourth column in Table 2 computes the number (NT) of trading days
necessary to achieve no trade and hence the efficient allocation. In our exemplar
case, the maximum number of units between the initial endowment and the final
efficient endowment is 60, so this is a lower bound on the number of trading sessions
required to achieve allocative efficiency. The ranking with respect to the time for
convergence to no trading is NTDoNTHoNTBoNTC. The differences are very
small but persistent.
The fifth column reports the distance (Dist.) of the final allocation from the
efficient allocation. (We measure the distance using the l1-norm normalized by the
number of traders: thus, dðe; eÞ ¼Pijei  ei j=n.) All protocols achieve the efficient
allocation, sometimes up to one unit for one trader who cannot find the counterpart
for his last unit trade. This problem surfaces only in D and H because the dealer
imposes a spread. This reduces liquidity in general, and in particular may prevent a
trade from occurring when the spread deters an agent from completing a transaction.
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Fig. 2. TT: volume versus time.
Table 2
TT: summary statistics for 100 passes with n ¼ 1; 000
Prot. Vol ExcV (%) NT Dist. CE Loss (%) SD Kurt.
B 11,251.32 2.61 148.72 0.00 87,873.32 0.00 4.61 6.90
C 28,706.28 162 149.51 0.00 87,873.32 0.00 31.57 3.77
D 11,090.54 1.57 142.97 0.11 87,816.42 0.065 4.16 0.74
H 16,141.92 47.2 145.06 0.012 87,844.09 0.033 2.85 0.016
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From a dynamic point of view, the ability of all protocols to achieve allocative
efficiency is shown in Fig. 3, which reports the distance of the current allocation from
the efficient one with respect to the cumulative volume. (Again, the curves for B and
D overlap.) This graph provides an implicit indicator of the ability of a protocol to
minimize the number of wasteful trades during its search for allocative efficiency.
In this respect, it confirms the former ranking fVolB;VolDgoVolHoVolC from
the perspective of how many trades are needed to achieve a given level of allocative
efficiency. In particular, when the efficient allocation is attained, the distance
drops down to zero and we recover the values reported in the second column of
Table 2.
Instead of volume, one may also plot the distance from the efficient allocation with
respect to time. Since during a trading session all agents are randomly sampled and
attempt to make a transaction, this would gauge the ability of a protocol to minimize
the number of unnecessary attempted trades on the part of the traders. We do not
report the plot here to save space. The ranking over {B, D, H} is inconclusive, but
each of these protocols consistently requires less time than C to attain a given level of
allocative efficiency. Even though the continuous double auction generates higher
trade within a session, this does not work towards reducing the number of
unnecessary calls in later sessions.
The sixth column in Table 2 reports the arithmetic average of traders’ certainty
equivalents at time NT, while the seventh column gives the percentage loss with
respect to the average certainty equivalent associated with the Walrasian allocation.
This latter statistics is zero for the batch auction and the continuous double auction,
because within these protocols all exchanges take place among traders who never
accept disadvantageous trades. It is relevant to evaluate the loss of welfare imposed
by the presence of a specialist dealer. Because of the bid–ask spread, when a trader
ARTICLE IN PRESS
0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000
0
5
10
15
20
Cumulative Volume
D
is
ta
n
c
e
 f
ro
m
 E
A
Cda
Batch
Specialist
Hybrid
Fig. 3. TT: distance from efficient allocation (EA) versus cumulative volume.
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with negative excess demand of one unit completes a transaction with a trader with
positive excess demand of one unit by going through the dealer, they end up jointly
losing some money to the dealer. The ranking for the monetary loss in the average
certainty equivalent when the efficient allocation is reached is 0 ¼ fLossB;LossCgo
LossHoLossD. This ranking is only partially confirmed from a dynamic point of
view in Fig. 4, which on the right reports the relative differences between the average
certainty equivalent of a protocol and that one of B. (The absolute levels are shown
on the left panel.) While B consistently exhibits the highest average certainty
equivalent, during the transient phase C switches from having the worst performance
to being as good as B. In other words, although C eventually minimizes the loss in
the average certainty equivalent, it has the worst performance during the first few
trading sessions.
Finally, the eighth and ninth columns in Table 2 report the standard deviation and
the kurtosis of the time series of the closing prices from the first trading day until
NT. The ranking with respect to overall volatility of prices is sHofsB;sDgosC.
Most of the time, the protocols generate empirical distributions for prices that are
leptokurtic; however, the kurtosis for D and H tends to be much closer to the value
associated with a normal distribution. In a different context, LiCalzi and Pellizzari
(2003) have already noted the propensity of the continuous double auction to
generate nonnormal statistics even under zero intelligence trading. From a dynamic
point of view, Fig. 5 reports the standard deviations of the closing prices computed
over time windows of 20 trading days. The volatility for C is initially very high, but
then settles down to levels similar to H.
The volatility for the batch auction increases when approaching the no trade time.
This is a well-known consequence of the instability of the k-double auction protocol
when the excess demand function has huge flats around the exchange price. We have
fixed k ¼ 1
2
by assumption, but the instability could be greatly reduced without
affecting allocative efficiency by manipulating the value of k. Based on the dynamic
comparison, the static ranking of protocols with respect to volatility should be taken
with a grain of salt.
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4.2. Other behavioral assumptions
The TT and TTþ assumptions describe behavioral assumptions under which
trading is, respectively, less or more aggressive than TT. Therefore, an analysis of
our simulations under TT provides a test to determine which findings are
imputable to our behavioral assumptions. If a ranking under TT is upset when this
behavioral assumption is changed, then we cannot claim that this ranking is
protocol-driven. Moreover, the analysis provides suggestive evidence for how
behavioral assumptions and protocol rules interact.
Table 3 reports summary statistics over the four protocols and the three
behavioral assumptions. As before, statistics are computed as averages over 100
different batches of simulations. The columns have the same meaning as in Table 2,
but for each protocol there are now three rows – one for each different behavioral
assumption. The central row for each protocol repeats for TT the same statistics
given in Table 2 for ease of comparison.
We have checked the averages against the medians for the same data and there are
no substantial differences, with two exceptions for the NT criterion under TT: the
average NT is 490.19 for B while the median is 398.50; similarly, the average NT is
401.26 for C while the median is 358.50. Occasionally, B and C under TT take
much longer to attain the no trading situation. We have also made a qualitative
comparison between these averages and the data from a sample of individual
simulations and we have found no major individual departures. For the special case
of H under TTþ, in each simulation the market takes much longer than 1500 trading
sessions2 to attain no trading. This occurs because a few spare traders who initially
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accumulate a huge trading surplus (by trading with the dealer) end up making a lot
of wasteful trades (with their peers) until they dissipate their surplus. Once the
surplus is down to zero, convergence takes place as usual. For all other combinations
of protocols and behavioral assumptions, convergence is usually attained within 500
sessions. This large discrepancy makes the statistics for H under TTþ inappropriate
for comparison, and hence we drop this case from consideration in all of the
following discussions.
The major result in this section is that there are no ranking reversals with respect
to TT for four of our six performance criteria: volume of trade, distance from the
efficient allocation, loss in the average certainty equivalent, and kurtosis. Both the
rankings deduced from the table or from the dynamic comparisons (not shown here)
are always the same as in TT. Regardless of the exact behavioral assumptions, the
qualitative performance of the protocols is analogous.
Consider, for instance, volume. The ranking deduced under TT is fVolB;VolDgo
VolHoVolC. Both TTþ and TT refine this ranking to VolDoVolBoVolHoVolC.
This suggests that in general the dealership is more likely to avoid wasteful trades
than the batch auction. Incidentally, we note that having D in the first place is
consistent with the spirit of Tatur (2005, p. 519), where it is shown that ‘the
introduction of a small tax [the dealer’s bid–ask spread] has a first order effect on
efficiency’.
Even when protocols rank similarly under different behavioral assumption,
Table 3 may provide a second layer of information. Within the same protocol, the
impact of more or less aggressive trading surfaces in the comparison of the absolute
levels of a performance measure. Consider again volume. Within each protocol,
as we move from TT to TTþ the cumulative traded volume increases. Therefore,
more aggressive trading inflates the number of unnecessary trades independently
of the trading protocol. On top of this, more aggressive trading in a dealership
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Table 3
Summary statistics for 100 passes with n ¼ 1; 000
Prot. Beh. Vol ExcV (%) NT Dist. CE Loss (%) SD Kurt.
B TT 11,107.51 1.30 490.19 0.00 87,873.32 0.00 2.15 36.19
TT 11,251.32 2.61 148.72 0.00 87,873.32 0.00 4.61 6.90
TTþ 13,398.05 22.2 148.27 0.00 87,873.32 0.00 3.25 16.56
C TT 25,117.49 129 401.26 0.00 87,873.32 0.00 18.25 18.06
TT 28,706.28 162 149.51 0.00 87,873.32 0.00 31.57 3.77
TTþ 36,609.01 234 175.75 0.00 87,873.32 0.00 31.11 4.04
D TT 10,853.59 0.006 143.50 0.24 87,817.04 0.064 4.36 0.85
TT 11,090.54 1.57 142.97 0.11 87,816.42 0.065 4.16 0.74
TTþ 12,356.54 12.6 160.58 0.018 87,810.60 0.071 3.72 1.11
H TT 14,396.18 31.3 158.05 0.012 87,840.57 0.037 2.89 0.11
TT 16,141.92 47.2 145.06 0.012 87,844.09 0.033 2.85 0.016
TTþ 28,017.38 156 [1500] 0.0093 87,843.56 0.034 0.88 37.5
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increases the losses in the average certainty equivalent while reducing the distance of
the final allocation from the efficient one.
For the remaining two criteria it is not possible to separate the effect of the
protocols from that of the behavioral assumptions, but some clear points emerge
anyway. Consider first the time for convergence to no trading. Comparing the
statistics about NT for B and C against those for D and H shows that the presence of
a dealer significantly reduces this time under the less aggressive trading associated
with TT. Intuitively, the higher efficacy sought by traders under TT slows down
the attainment of efficiency only in the absence of the price-stabilizing influence of
the specialist. On the other hand, it is not clear which protocols converge faster in
general. It is worth noting that TT tends to improve the time for convergence,
presumably because it is more likely to generate the right prices. Once a protocol has
reached an allocation sufficiently close to the efficient one, it has to wait until one of
the few ‘inefficient’ traders draws a price close to p in order to complete a
transaction. Meanwhile, under TT several sessions go away with no trades at all;
conversely, under TTþ there are too many unnecessary trades that take place at
prices away from p. Therefore, on average, convergence under TT takes longer to
be achieved.
Regarding the volatility of prices, the original ranking sHofsB;sDgosC under
TT has a reversal between H and B under TT while it is refined to sBosD under
TTþ. If we exclude H from the comparison, the ranking across the three behavioral
assumptions is always consistent with sBosDosC. While the advantages of the
batch auction in reducing price dispersion with respect to the continuous double
auction were already clear from the TT case alone, this makes a case for the batch
auction to be more effective at reducing price volatility than the dealership as well.
A second effect, instead, separates the protocols with a dealer from those without.
For B and C, price dispersion is minimum under TT and maximum under TT;
therefore, increasing the aggressiveness of trading has no monotonic effect on price
volatility. On the other hand, in the presence of a dealer, the protocols D and H
exhibit less volatility as trading gets more aggressive.
4.3. Additional tests of robustness
We have tested the robustness of our model under several different instantiations
of its parameters. The only variable with a significant impact on the results is the
overall liquidity of the system. When there is no sufficient cash in the system, some
transactions that would enhance the allocative efficiency violate budget constraints
and cannot be carried out. All the simulations reported in this paper are not affected
by issues originating from insufficient liquidity.
In order to provide the reader with a more specific appreciation of this robustness,
let us turn to the exemplar parametric configuration given in Table 1. We have
run separate checks on each parameter, while keeping the others fixed. For each of
these checks, we have obtained summary statistics (computed as averages over
batches of 25 different simulations) and compared the rankings associated with
them. Within a large range of values for each parameter, the rankings stay almost
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always unchanged. For instance, initializing n ¼ 250 instead of n ¼ 1; 000 produces
only one change in the rankings: under TT, the kurtosis for B is now lower than
for C. Similarly, no appreciable changes in the rankings emerge if we initialize
traders’ individual parameters so that exact convergence to the equilibrium
price cannot take place because the equilibrium price does not fit on the grid of
possible values.
A particularly interesting test of robustness was run on the initial dealer’s quotes.
As described in Section 3.1, the exemplar configuration assumes an initial bid of 746
and an initial ask of 751. This bid–ask interval is not far from the competitive
equilibrium price of 760, raising the legitimate suspicion that this might favorably
bias the performance of the specialist-based protocols. Therefore, we ran two
batches of 25 simulations each assuming a large variation of up to 33% in the
initial dealer’s quotes; more precisely, we assumed an initial bid–ask interval of
½495; 501 and ½895; 901, respectively. We observed no changes in the final rankings.
Clearly, when the initial interval is ½495; 501, the initial ask quote vastly
underestimates the equilibrium price. Therefore, the dealer is initially obliged to
go short on stock and match the strong incoming excess demand at prices
unfavorable to her. Nonetheless, her quotes recover sufficiently fast that, when the
no trade time is reached, the monetary value of her position is invariably increased;
in other words, the dealer’s subsequent profits from trading with a bid–ask spread
suffice to make up for her initial losses. A symmetric conclusion holds when the
initial quotes overestimate the equilibrium price.
A final test of robustness comes from a comparison of our results with those in
Bottazzi et al. (2005). Although it is based on a different set of behavioral
assumptions, this paper is closest to ours in the literature. In particular, their
simulations depend significantly on a parameter Z that represents the share of market
(versus limit) orders issued by the agents. Their environment is most similar to ours
when Z ¼ 0, so we look at this special case in their paper.
For Z ¼ 0, there are three explicit conclusions that compare directly with our
findings. First, Section 5.2.1 reports that the ‘allocative efficiency is relatively
insensitive to the particular ecology of agents’ in the market. We have confirmed the
insensitivity of the allocative efficiency. Second, Section 5.2.2 reports that the mean
absolute deviation for returns under C is greater than the mean absolute deviation
under B. We have found the same result for the volatility of prices. Third, Table 6 in
p. 30 reports that the kurtosis for returns is higher under B than under C. We have
obtained the same result for the kurtosis of the distribution of prices. This latter
result, in particular, suggests the conjecture that a substantial difference in the
kurtosis may be a ‘signature’ for a difference in the two protocols that is robust to
the behavioral assumptions. We leave it to future research to ascertain its validity.
5. Conclusions
The experimental literature has collected ample empirical evidence about trading
by human agents in the continuous double auction. As summarized in Smith (1982),
the evidence shows that allocations and prices converge rapidly to the competitive
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equilibrium predictions, even if the informational requirements of this protocol are
very simple. Gode and Sunder (1993) argue that the robustness of this conclusion is
due to an intrinsic ability of the protocol to guide traders towards the efficient
allocation. Our study confirms the allocative efficiency of the continuous double
auction under two additional behavioral assumptions and, more importantly,
extends Gode and Sunder’s claim to other simple protocols.
Our (computerized) experiments show that there are several simple protocols
whose ability to achieve allocative efficiency seems comparable and pretty robust.
Therefore, their performance should also be assessed over other relevant dimensions.
Under our behavioral assumptions, a direct comparison with the batch auction
shows that the continuous double auction is an inferior protocol with respect to
volume, time to convergence, and volatility of prices. (The only exception is time to
convergence under the TT assumption.) This strongly suggests that the
experimental literature should give more attention to a comparative study of
simultaneous versus sequential protocols; see Section 4.3.1.1 in Madhavan (2000) for
a related argument.
We extend the comparison to two alternative simple protocols. The first one is a
nondiscretionary form of specialist dealership, in which the rule by which quotes
react to transactions is entirely automated and the specialist must adjust prices by
one in the direction of the last trade completed. The specialist protocol is equivalent
to introducing an additional agent in the market, who in a sense brings more
rationality to traders’ groping for the efficient allocation. However, note that the
specialist dealer is not required to exhibit zero intelligence and must accept all trades
that she is proposed. It turns out that following the nondiscretionary rule suffices to
produce (modest) gains while keeping her inventory under control. Intuitively,
although she may occasionally lose money on some trade, our implementation of the
specialist dealership improves her wealth on average. Glosten and Milgrom (1985)
prove formally that this holds for a more sophisticated version of specialist
dealership in an environment with diversely informed traders.
Under our behavioral assumptions, this specialist protocol and the batch auction
vie for the best performance with respect to minimizing wasteful trades, time to
convergence, and price dispersion. The main drawback of the specialist protocol is
that it drains a tiny amount of wealth from the traders. On the other hand, as this
dealer’s ‘profit’ might be reallocated to traders at the end of the process, a
nondiscretionary dealership remains a natural candidate to investigate in the search
for effective protocols to achieve allocative efficiency.
We finally tested a hybrid protocol that sides the specialist dealer with the
continuous double auction giving each trader the option to transact at the most
favorable quote available. Under our behavioral assumptions, the hybrid
protocol reduces the volatility of prices and the gains of the specialist, but is
otherwise inferior to the specialist protocol. The reduction in volatility and in the
dealer’s gains are easily explained. The specialist starts with initial quotes that may
be away from the equilibrium price and must keep a fixed bid–ask spread. Almost all
trades initially go through her until her quotes adjust to a level compatible with the
equilibrium price. From then on, competition from the traders may occasionally
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provide better quotes than the dealer’s bid–ask spread permits, thereby reducing
volatility and her gains.
To conclude, we find that under our behavioral assumptions the four protocols
generically converge to the efficient allocation in finite time. An extended
comparison over other performance criteria suggests that the all-round ranking
has the batch auction and the dealership vying for the first place while the
continuous double auction takes fourth place. The exact ranking for the four
protocols depends on the weights given to the performance criteria, although we
personally judge the nondiscretionary dealership marginally superior. Finally, we
remark that these conclusions hold assuming no informational effects and severely
restricting the options for strategic behavior on the part of traders.
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